Related Papers
The Berlin Review of Books
Knowledge in a Conspiratorial World
2017 •
Ori Freiman
A review of M. R. X. Dentith's 'The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories'. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 190 pages, Hardcover.
Conspiracies Then, Now and Tomorrow: How Do Past Instances Affect the Likelihood of Similar Events Now?
M R. X. Dentith
6 From Evil Others to Evil Elites A Dominant Pattern in Conspiracy Theories Today
Véronique Campion-Vincent
Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories
Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories
2020 •
Michael Butter
This handbook provides the most complete analysis of the phenomenon to date. It analyses conspiracy theories from a variety of perspectives, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. It maps out the key debates, and includes chapters on the historical origins of conspiracy theories, as well as their political significance in a broad range of countries and regions. Other chapters consider the psychology and the sociology of conspiracy beliefs, in addition to their changing cultural forms, functions and modes of transmission. This handbook examines where conspiracy theories come from, who believes in them and what their consequences are.
Forthcoming in in Olli Loukola ed. Secrets and Conspiracies, Rodopi
Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited
2018 •
Charles R Pigden
Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated - that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic ‘oughts’ that apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies that are partly under our control. I argue that the policy of systematically doubting or disbelieving conspiracy theories conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation, since it leads to the conclusion that history is bunk and the nightly news unbelievable. In fact (of course) the policy is not employed systematically but is only wheeled on to do down theories that the speaker happens to dislike. I develop a deductive argument from hard-to-deny premises that if you are not a ‘conspiracy theorist’ in my anodyne sense of the word then you are an ‘idiot’ in the Greek sense of the word, that is, someone so politically purblind as to have no opinions about either history or public affairs. The conventional wisdom can only be saved (if at all) if ‘conspiracy theory’ is given a slanted definition. I discuss some slanted definitions apparently presupposed by proponents of the conventional wisdom (including, amongst others, Tony Blair) and conclude that even with these definitions the conventional wisdom comes out as deeply unwise. I finish up with a little harmless fun at the expense of David Aaronvitch whose abilities as a rhetorician and a popular historian are not perhaps matched by a corresponding capacity for logical thought.
Plotting Future Directions in Conspiracy Theory Research
Peter Knight
Conspiracy Theories in Europe Compilation
Charlotte Ward
Two and a half years ago, Political Capital, Counterpoint, the Center for Research on Prejudice, the Institute for Public Affairs, and the Zachor Foundation embarked on a project to develop an effective response to conspiracy theories in Europe. I am not a contributor to this book but have uploaded it here as it reads: This book is available to download and re-use under a by-nc-sa Creative Commons license ported to UK law. This means that you are free to copy, distribute, display and perform the work, and make derivative works, in a non-commercial context, as long as you credit Counterpoint, Political Capital and the author and share the resulting works under an equivalent license.
Conspiracy Narratives in contemporary society
2015 •
Nicholas Ulbrick
“We live in an age of conspiracy” says Don DeLillo (1989). In 2014 it seems that conspiracy theories, and speculation concerning the “truth” about major events, has become a popular theme and pastime in contemporary society. From sold out eleven hour David Icke presentations at Wembley Stadium in the UK (as well as his world tours), to the ever expanding radio and television network of Alex Jones in the United States, it is clear that there is more than just a fringe interest in conspiracy theories. In the academic literature dating back to Richard Hofstadter (1964) though, the phenomenon has been cast as a purely pathological or paranoid behaviour. Recent works, such as that of Sunstien and Vermeule (2009), Aaronovitch (2011) and van der Linden (2013) go further in suggesting that engagement with conspiracy theories is not only a pathological behaviour, but a danger both to modern society and one which threatens to bring an end to the “age of reason.” Others however, such as Jane a...
CONSPIRACY THEORY (AN INTRODUCTION)
David G. Ebhohimen AICMC
This paper interrogates the concept of conspiracy theory and its impacts on global political affairs. The narrative is saddled with the sole responsibility of exploring the different aspects or areas of the concept such as the history or the origin, various examples and political uses of conspiracy theory. It is common knowledge that some people will never agree that some events happened as a result of a certain cause, in order words, the relationship of cause and effect. This set/group of people as earlier stated, never agree that some things happened by accident or co-incidence, for them they hold the belief that an event is plot: a belief that a particular event is the result of a secret plot rather than the actions of an individual person or chance. (Microsoft Encarta;2009). This group of people are called conspiracy theorists.
1 Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited
2013 •
olli loukola
Conspiracy theories should be neither believed nor investigated that is the conventional wisdom. I argue that it is sometimes permissible both to investigate and to believe. Hence this is a dispute in the ethics of belief. I defend epistemic ‘oughts’ which apply in the first instance to belief-forming strategies which are partly under our control. But the belief-forming strategy of not believing conspiracy theories would be a political disaster and the epistemic equivalent of self-mutilation. I discuss several variations of this strategy, interpreting ‘conspiracy theory’ in different ways but I conclude that on all these readings, the conventional wisdom is deeply unwise. 1) Political Ploys and Epistemic Principles The conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories is that they ought not to be believed. To call something ‘a conspiracy theory’ is to suggest that it is intellectually suspect; to call someone ‘a conspiracy theorist’ is to suggest that he or she is irrational, paranoid o...
